The
Cosomological Argument for the Existence of GodBy
St. Aquinas, The Summa Theologica Pt.1, Q.2, Art. 2-3
Trailing
behind the Teleological Argument, the Cosmological Argument by St.
Aquinas, the second of the Quinquae Viae, has been the most popular
defense for the existence of God. By asserting the principles of
natural theology, this 13th
century argument has retained its popularity because of its simple,
but empirically assisted, proofs. In this essay I would like to
analyze the three parts of St. Aquinas' argument – the axiom of
causes, order of causes, and the finiteness of the universe –
declaring their merits and then following the analysis with an
argument of St. Aquinas' shortcoming provided by Dr. Plantinga.
However, though this argument has bore the scrutiny of almost seven
centuries, including Dr. Plantinga's, I believe that St. Aquinas'
Cosmological Argument is sufficient in proving the necessary
existence of God.
Aquinas begins by demonstrating a system of efficient causes with
several definitions that would eventually exclude the idea of an
infinite causal loop. The first definition is an axiom of
observation: the nature of causation follow a specified order labeled
as causes, efficient causes, effects, and ultimate effects. The
Second definition, that is inferential from the first, is that if
this order stands then causes cannot be the efficient cause of
themselves because, as Aquinas argues, “then the cause would have
to be prior to itself... this being impossible.” To demonstrate
this, we could say that by pressing the gas peddle your car will
begin to move – demonstrating the relationship between efficient
causes and effects – but it would be preposterous to continue the
argument and say that the gas peddle is also being pushed because the
car is moving. Not only does the latter create a circular, or
self-substantiating argument, it supposes that the car is moving
prior to the gas peddle being push AND moving because the gas peddle
is being push. This definition, of course, contradicts the idea of a
causal loop simply because, as already demonstrated, a Causal loop
fails to have a first, or originate, cause. Aquinas has another cut
at this argument, but in a different way, that I will address next.
But this is his definition of the order of causes, efficient causes,
and effects.
The second part that Aquinas addresses, he responds to the idea of a
infinite line of causation by providing a causal chain imperative.
Similar to the previous argument, he brings up empirical evidence of
interlocking causes, efficient causes, effects, and ultimate effects.
But since this point is in addition to his previous argument, Aquinas
makes his point a bit more complex. First he identifies with the
mathematical challenge of actualizing “actual infinity”, as would
be later falsified by Mathematical Set Theory, by stating that an
actually infinite line has no beginning and no end. Thus, in simple
translation, in a stream of infinite causation you must drop the idea
of a first cause and an ultimate effect (the beginning and the end).
As St. Aquinas explains, “But if in efficient causes it is possible
to go on to infinity, there will be no fist efficient cause, neither
will there be an ultimate effect...” What Aquinas is arguing is if
you take away the first cause you must also take away the last
effect, and if you take away both the first cause and ultimate effect
then what evidence can you provide of having an intermediate cause?
Are there any justifiable reasons to argue that the entire universe
is held by only intermediate causes? I would agree with Aquinas when
he says, “It's impossible.”
But this is where Aquinas ends his cosmological inquiry. He
identifies an empirical order of efficient causes in the universe, he
discredits an infinite causal loop, argues directly against any
“actual” infinity arguments, and ends not with a solution but a
defined void that necessitates God – something that must have been
causeless, infinite, and the necessary first cause of the universe.
Or, as St. Aquinas would say, “Therefore it is necessary to admit a
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”
Though Aquinas has been merited by the physical sciences, and his use
of natural theology, is it still subjected to several severe
shortcomings. These shortcomings were detailed by Dr. Alvin Plantinga
in his book God and Other Minds.
He dedicates the first part not only to demonstrate weaknesses of the
cosmological argument, but, even though outside the scope of this
essay, to weaknesses of Natural Theology as a whole. His arguments
contend that the Cosmological Argument fails to determine where the
termination of causes resides and that the Cosmological Argument
fails to attributed “God” to a specific form of Theism.
Dr. Plantinga's proposal against St. Aquinas' first part of his
argument, as details in paragraph two, entails questioning where the
termination of causes resides. Now for a moment, one would expect a
complex array of philosophical, meta-analogical, or theological
truths that have been buried in multi-translated books. However, this
isn't even remotely close to the truth. Dr. Plantinga simple points
out that St. Aquinas makes too large of a jump from point one to
point two. Just because objects end doesn't conclude at what point
they end. And so his argument is that the universe could have had an
infinite past and will ultimately end some time in the future.
His second argument against St. Aquinas' involves particularity of
Deity. If given all the arguments of St. Aquinas, the order of
causation, the fixed point of causal termination, and the finiteness
of the universe, Dr. Plantinga argues that St. Aquinas made another
“leap” from point to point. How is it that an infinite,
causeless, or necessary first cause entail an animate, personal, or
in any form, a rational God? The case being made by Dr. Plantinga
against St. Aquinas is that there are two jumps being made that
ultimately cannot be made, and that since St. Aquinas' argument
stands or falls upon those two points, it remains that St. Aquinas'
argument must fall.
In presenting St. Aquinas' Cosmological argument, I set out to
briefly attend to the analysis of the three parts of his argument, to
show why perhaps I would agree with such arguments, and to do so
while providing the reader with an adequate view of short comings.
Though it is unfair to contain St. Aquinas and Dr. Plantinga to a few
short paragraphs, I would hope that there would be instilled a
schemata for further investigation, a view that nothing is entirely
sealed from further human inquiry – even if has survived for eight
centuries.
